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COLLUSIVE EQUILIBRIUM IN THE
GREAT SALT DUOPOLY*
Ray Rees
This paper sets out to test two interesting lines of recent development in
oligopoly theory. The first, arising out of the analysis of infinitely repeated
games, suggests conditions under which collusive outcomes can be supported as
non-cooperative equilibria by appropriate threat strategies. The second
considers the nature of equilibrium in a homogeneous duopoly in which firms
set prices subject to fixed capacity constraints. Both these bodies of theory are
discussed more fully in the next section.
The data used for the tests are given in a report on the UK Monopolies and
Merger Commission (MMC) inquiry into price behaviour in the UK market
for white salt.^ In this market two firms produce an essentially homogeneous
commodity with blockaded entry and fixed capacities. The report provides
detailed data on prices, outputs and (marginal) costs as well as a great deal of
more qualitative information which is valuable in interpreting these data. The
information in the report is derived directly from the working of a real-world
oligopoly. Its main drawback is that it relates only to five years, and does not
allow standard econometric methods to be applied, in particular to the
estimation of a demand function.
Nevertheless, this paper hopes to demonstrate that some quite strong
conclusions can still be drawn, in particular on the extent to which the various
possible equilibrium concepts proposed by the theoretical literature can
explain the apparent nature ofthe equilibrium in this case. The wealth of detail
given in the report seems too good to ignore, even if it cannot support a
standard econometric investigation.
There is a correspondence between the two types of model with which this
paper is concerned and the positions taken by the MMC and the firms that
* Earlier versions of this paper have been presented at seminars at the Universities of Birmingham, Bristol,
East Anglia, and Swansea, the European University Institute, Florence, the Institute of Economics and
Statistics, University of Oxford, and Northwestern University, Evanston, 111. I am grateful to participants
in those seminars for many helpful comments, as well as to James Friedman, Rolf Fare, Shawna Grosskopf,
Dan Kovenock, Val Lambson, Venk Sadanand, Mike Waterson and two referees. None of these of course
bears responsibility for the final version.
' 'White salt: A Report on the Supply of White Salt in the United Kingdom by producers of such salt',
H.M.S.O. London 1986. This is subsequently referred to as MMC (1986). Though the present author was
at the time a member of the MMC he was not involved in this particular inquiry, and all the information
used in this paper was derived solely from the published report.
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were the subject of the inquiry. The theory of price-setting duopoly under
capacity constraints assumes that firms act non-cooperatively, making no
attempt, whether tacit or explicit, to agree upon their choice of prices. The
firms in the MMC inquiry claimed that they had in fact not colluded, and that
.the market outcome was fully consistent with 'competitive' behaviour. By
examining whether the predictions of the price-setting model match what
happened in this market, we have simultaneously a test of the model and also
of whether the firms' claims can be accepted.
While skating carefully around the word 'collusion', the MMC concluded
that the firms had 'severely restrained price competition'.^ The basis for this
judgement appears to have been some evidence on communication between the
firms, the fact that over a long period prices had been virtually identical and
changed more or less simultaneously, and finally a view of what the outcome
should have been had the firms in fact competed. This view was not based on
the predictions ofthe models considered here, and it is indeed questionable that
it could be supported by any generally accepted positive model of the market,
but later in this paper we argue that the MMC's judgement was essentially
correct.
Given then that the behaviour of the firms can be taken to be collusive, the
question arises of whether this can be explained by recent developments in the
analysis of repeated games. In the next section we present brief outlines ofthe
relevant theories and identify the sense in which they will be tested in this
paper.
I. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Consider a market with two firms producing homogeneous outputs in a single
time period, and independently choosing prices subject to equal, constant
marginal costs and exogenously given capacity constraints. Edgeworth (1897)
showed that if each firm's capacity is less than market demand at a price equal
to the given marginal cost, the Bertrand result that equilibrium price equals
marginal cost no longer holds. If the market situation is repeated over a
sequence of periods, price will vary cyclically between well-defined upper and
lower limits,/>ft and/>j. The upper limit/(^ is the price which maximises a firm's
profit given that it is undercut by its competitor. The firm with the lower price
produces at capacity, the higher-priced firm is then faced with a residual
demand with respect to which it finds the most profitable price/);,. The lower
limit/)j is the price which yields a firm the same profit n* when it is the lower-
priced firm and produces to capacity, as when it is the higher priced firm and
sets /»ft. In general />, exceeds marginal cost. If, however, we insist that the
analysis must relate to only one time period, i.e. to a 'one-shot game',
then Edgeworth essentially shows that no equilibrium price exists in this
model.
Shubik (1959) gave this result a game-theoretic reinterpretation: in this
game there is no equilibrium in pure price strategies, but there is an
" Para. 9.10, MMC (1986).
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equilibrium in mixed strategies. Beckman (1965) and Levitan and Shubik
(1972) derived these equilibrium mixed strategies for specific examples of the
model, the main difference between them being in the assumptions made about
the rationing process. When the firms set different prices, some assumption
must be made as to how the residual demand facing the higher-priced firm is
determined, or equivalently, how buyers wishing to be supplied by the lower-
priced firm are rationed. Beckman assumed a form of random rationing.
Levitan and Shubik assumed efficient rationing: the lower-priced firm supplies
those buyers with higher willingness to pay.* For concreteness, we focus here on
this latter case. Then the equilibrium outcome in this type of market is
predicted to be as follows: there is a given interval of prices which is defined by
the Edgeworth upper and lower bounds p^^ and j&,. Firms choose prices
randomly from this interval, and the equilibrium probability distributions
regulating these choices are such that each firm has the same expected profit
n* whatever the price pair chosen. It follows that there is a zero probability
that the firms will choose equal prices, and that if the market situation is
repeated after a period, each firm's price changes randomly (within the given
interval) over time.*
An interesting extension of these results with particular relevance to the
market studied in this paper has recently been made by Deneckere and
Kovenock (1992). They allow the (still exogenously given) capacity levels of
the firms, as well as their (constant) marginal costs, to differ, and consider the
question of the endogenous non-cooperative determination of the identity of a
price leader in this model. That is, firms engage in a game of timing of price
announcements, and the equilibrium of the game determines which firm is the
price leader and which the follower. Their result is that the firm with larger
capacity will be the price leader, while the smaller firm will follow with a price
just below that of the leader, and will produce at full capacity. Thus the price
set by the leader isp^, the upper bound of the Edgeworth interval, and it earns
the same profit n* as in the mixed strategy equilibrium. On the other hand the
smaller firm earns higher profit under price leadership than under simultaneous
choice of (mixed strategy) prices, since it is producing to capacity at a price
greater than />,.
The theories then give quite definite testable predictions about the kind of
price behaviour we should observe in this type of market. It is argued in the
next section that the market for white salt is the type of market for which these
models can apply, and therefore can be used to test these theories.
For a thorough discussion of the economics of these rationing schemes see Dixon (1987),
* Capacity is here taken to be exogenous, Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) allow capacity levels to be chosen
endogenously, in a two stage game. At the second stage firms play a price-setting game with fixed capacities.
At the first stage they choose capacities in the light of their effects on the equilibrium at the second stage.
The interesting result is that capacities are chosen to be such that outputs and price are precisely those given
by the Coumot equilibrium of the model. This result is further generalised by Osborne and Pitchik (1986),
Unfortunately, as Davidson and Deneckere (1986) show, this striking reconciliation of the results of quantity-
setting and price-setting duopoly models is not robust to relaxation of the 'efficient rationing' assumption.
Moreover, as we show below, its prediction that both firms will produce at capacity is not confirmed in the
market being considered. However, this is probably not a fair test of the theory, since capacity in this market
is best taken as exogenous over the period to which the observations relate,
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The models just discussed are essentially 'one-shot games': they are
concerned with deriving a Nash equilibrium in a single play ofthe price-setting
game. However, if we move to the empirically more relevant view ofthe market
as an infinitely repeated game, then it is well-known that repeated plays of the
one-shot Nash equilibrium also represent a Nash equilibrium of the repeated
game. However, the important point is that other Nash equilibria are possible,
and in particular those that yield the firms more profitable outcomes than those
in the one-shot non-cooperative equilibrium. The basic idea underlying the
work of Friedman (1971), Abreu (1986, 1988) and Fudenberg and Maskin
(1986) among others, is that these more profitable outcomes in the one-shot
game may be sustained as non-cooperative Nash equiUbria of the repeated
game by threats of appropriate punishments for deviation. The intuition is
clear. If a firm deviates from an agreement to collude in one period, it could
be punished in later periods, and the threat of this ex ante may be enough to
sustain collusion. However, going beyond intuition, a number of issues have to
be considered. What form can or should punishment take and will it be
sufficient in fact to offset these gains since it causes future losses which have to
be discounted to be comparable with immediate gains from deviating?
Moreover, since punishment will often hurt the punishers, for example a
punitive price war reduces profits to all firms, will threats to carry out such
punishment in fact be credible?
A formal answer to these questions is given by Abreu's theory of ' simple
penal codes', which has been applied to the case of price-setting capacity-
constrained oligopoly by Lambson (1987, 1991). Suppose that firms agree,
tacitly or explicitly, on a particular price and allocation of outputs for each
period. They also agree on a time path of prices that will be applied as a
punishment for a deviation from the agreed price by a firm, where this
punishment path may depend on exactly which firm deviates. A punishment
path is credible if it is in each firm's interest not to deviate from it in the event
that it has to be imposed. An agreed price and output allocation is sustainable
if it would not pay any firm to deviate from it given the credible punishment
path that would then be imposed. An interesting aspect ofthe punishment path
is its 'stick and carrot' nature. In the first stage of punishment, price is cut to
inflict loss of profit, but this is followed by a second stage of reversion to the
more profitable price and output allocation. It then pays a firm that has just
deviated to accept its punishment, since failure to do so leads to reimposition
of the punitive phase of the punishment path and postponement of the return
to the more profitable cooperative phase. If a firm that did not deviate
originally refused to participate in punishing the firm that did, then it itself
would become a deviant and have the appropriate punishment path inflicted
on it. In this theory the requirement of credibility is formally embodied in the
concept of subgame perfect equilibrium. The strategy of adhering to the agreed
price and output allocation as long as no firm deviates, and adhering to the
prescribed punishment path immediately following any deviation, is shown to
induce a Nash equilibrium for every possible subgame ofthe infinitely repeated
game. Of course, if the cooperative agreement is sustainable, we would not
© Royal Economic Society 1993
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actually observe implementation of the punishment strategies - the observed
market equilibrium would be the agreed price and output allocation.
Any particular price and output allocation may or may not be sustainable
by Abreu's punishment strategies or simple penal code. This depends on the
firms' discount factors and the structure of the market - the demand and cost
functions the firms face. Those determine the extent ofthe gains from deviation,
the losses of profit that can be infiicted through punishment, and the present
value of future losses relative to immediate gains from deviation. For our
present purposes, we are interested in the question: if we were to accept that
firms in the white salt market behaved collusively, whether tacitly or explicitly,
is this consistent with the models of Abreu and Lambson? We would conclude
that it was, if the actual allocation turned out to be sustainable by Abreu-type
punishment strategies, while if the actual allocation turned out to be not
sustainable (at reasonable discount rates), we would have to reject the theory
and look for some alternative explanation of collusion. Note that this is a one-
sided test of the theory. It would also be interesting to find a market in which
collusion did not take place, and to examine whether more profitable
allocations than the actual one would be sustainable, in which case we could
again reject the theory.* This will however have to be left for further work.
II. THE MARKET FOR VV^HITE SALT
This section sets out briefiy some saHent facts about the salt market.^
Production. Salt production in the United Kingdom consists essentially of the
extraction and processing of a non-renewable natural resource. However,
reserves are so large relative to consumption that the resource rent is effectively
zero and we can regard salt as a manufactured commodity. Water is pumped
down into salt strata lying underground, this dissolves the salt to form brine,
which is then pumped to the surface and transported through a pipeline to,
initially, a purification plant. Here chemicals are added to remove unwanted
minerals, then the purified brine is pumped to an evaporation plant. Six large
boilers, known as effects, are arranged in sequence, brine is pumped into the
first, the water is boiled off and the salt precipitated, and the waste steam is
passed into the second effect where it is used to heat more brine, and so on.
After the evaporation process 'undried salt' is produced, with the consistency
of wet sand. Part of this output is shipped immediately to chemical plants,
mainly for use in production of caustic soda and chlorine. The remainder is
dried, and then shipped, in bulk or in bags, again to chemical plants for use in
^ To put this more precisely, consider the set of all markets, and the subsets of markets (a) which satisfy
Abreu's conditions for the sustainability of an agreed allocation by credible threats, and (A) in which
collusion is observed. I interpret Abreu's theory to say that these subsets are equal. All that this paper can
do, in considering just one market, is to show that their intersection is not empty, if Abreu's conditions are
satisfied; or that the sets are not equal, ifthe conditions are not satisfied. In this latter case the set in (a) could
still be a subset of that in (A), in which case Abreu's conditions would be sufficient but not necessary for
collusion.
' A fuller description, together with a complete set of the data on which the later discussion is based, is
given in Rees (1991).
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production of sodium and chloride, but also to food manufacturing and animal
feed preparation plants, and tanning and dyeing works. Less than 10% of total
salt output is sold for cooking or table use.
Concentration. There are effectively just two producers: British Salt, (BS), a
self contained but wholly-owned subsidiary of an industrial engineering and
contracting group, Stavely Industries; and ICI Weston Point, (WP), a small
part of the Mond division of the large chemicals conglomerate ICI.
Fortunately for this study WP is a self-contained accounting unit selling less
than 5 % of its output to other ICI plants. Imports and a number of very small
salt works account for around 3 % of the market and so in the rest of this study
will be ignored. We treat BS and WP as single-plant profit maximising firms.
BS takes on average about 55 % of the UK market and WP the remainder.
Capacity. Each firm is subject to a maximum capacity constraint, which is 824
kilotonnes (kte) pa for BS and 1095 kte pa for WP. Over the years 1980-4 there
was considerable excess capacity: BS averaged less than 75% capacity
utilisation, while WP's UK sales alone amounted only to 45 % of capacity, on
average, though its export sales, made at a much lower profit, brought its
capacity utilisation rate up to around 65%. The degree of excess capacity
appears to have been caused by an unanticipated decline in demand since the
capacity was first installed in the early 1970s.
Entry. Though salt strata suitable for extraction are common in the United
Kingdom, a combination of planning controls and high transport costs seems
to rule out production outside the Cheshire area in which both BS and ICI's
plants are located. The main users are located quite closely to the salt plants,
while at the prevailing prices imports were not regarded as a threat because of
the high cost of transport and transshipment relative to value. The major salt
strata in Cheshire are owned by the incumbent firms. Moreover, there are
significant economies of scale and as we have just seen significant excess
capacity in the market. In the rest of this study therefore we assume that the
market behaviour of the incumbents has been infiuenced by the threat of new
entry only to the extent that the possibility of imports places an upper bound
on the price that can be set.
Costs. The MMC report suggested that variations in output by BS can be
achieved without significantly affecting energy usage per unit of output (para
4-10, MMC (1986)) and, since this is the main variable input, we translate this
into the assumption that over the relevant rarfge of outputs average variable
cost of production {ave) is constant as output varies and so equals marginal
production cost. WP, which has a somewhat different technology than BS, has
a more complex cost structure. Reductions in output below capacity are most
efficiently coped with by reducing the number of effects in operation, and this
raises ave in a stepwise way.' See Fig. i. The MMC report gives an indication
' As Fig. I shows, fixed production costs are assumed not to depend on the number of effects in operation.
The total cost function jumps discontinuously at an output level (here 400 kte pa and 800 kte pa are chosen
for purposes of illustration) at which it becomes efficient to change the number of effects in operation.
Essentially, however, we are interested only in the middle step, which corresponds to the actual operations,
and costs in the neighbourhood of WP's capacity output.
© Royal Economic Society 1993
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of the heights of these steps but does not give the precise output levels at which
the steps occur. In the period under study WP operated along the middle step.
In addition to production cost, the other component of variable cost is
distribution cost, consisting mainly of transport costs. We assume these are
constant per unit of output. Marginal cost MC is then the sum of ave and
average distribution cost. Finally, we define as average avoidable cost (aac) a
firm's MC plus 'fixed production costs' per unit of output. The latter,
consisting mainly of labour, management and maintenance costs, do not vary
with output, but are incurred if and only if the plant is operating: aac is therefore
zero if output is zero and the plant is shut down, aac^ denotes BS's aac at its
capacity output, and similarly SaCg is WP's capacity aac and takes into account
WP's lower average variable production cost at capacity, due to six-effect
operation. Since all these costs play an important role in what follows, it is
useful to summarise the full range of information in Table i.
Table i
Eirms' Marginal and Average Avoidable Costs
ave
me
aae
BS
WP
BS
WP
BS
WP
1980
6-30
6-02
9-81
12-77
12-61
14-46
Year
1981
8-07
7-39
12-11
14-22
15-07
15-68
Souree: MMC
1982
8-12
9-49
12-03
1474
14-72
16-28
(1986).
1983
9-21
10-82
13-67
16-77
17-07
18-49
1984
9-07
11-47
13-36
16-14
17-01
17-72
The data in Table i, interpreted here as the actual values of marginal and
average avoidable costs firms would have used in their decision-taking, are one
of the most valuable contributions of the MMC report, given the concerns of
© Royal Economic Society 1993
840 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL
this paper. We should at this point therefore enter a qualification. We shall
throughout conduct the analysis as if there is only one output. However, there
are at least three: undried and dried salt sold in bulk, and dried salt sold in
bags. The last two outputs niust be somewhat costlier to produce because of the
additional drying and/or bagging costs. It is impossible to disaggregate the cost
data among these three outputs (for example no separate figures are given on
bulk and bagged dried salt sales). However, for each firm the proportions of
total output accounted for by each type of salt remained fairly stable over this
period. For WP, undried salt varied apparently randomly between 35 % and
41 % of total output and for BS between 30% and 37 %. Thus we assume that
no significant systematic bias results from treating output as homogeneous.
This is helped by the fact that, as we see below, the two firms made identical
percentage increases in the prices of all types of salt over this period.
Prices. In a fascinating section of the report (paras 5-25-5-41, MMC (1986)),
the MMC lists the dates and amounts of the seventeen changes to list prices
made by the two firms between January 1974 and January 1984. The increases
are always either exactly or virtually identical. From 1980 each firm made the
same percentage increases across all grades of salt, prior to this increases varied
across grades. In each case one firm announced its price increases and the
second firm followed within a month and usually within two weeks. Of the 13
price increases announced from 1974-80, BS led 8 times and WP led 5 times.
In each of the years 1981-4, WP was the leader. Typically the leader would
inform the follower of its planned price increase a month before it came into
effect, and the latter would then inform the leader of its proposed (identical)
price change within that period (Table 5-8 of MMC (1986)).
In their evidence to the MMC on this matter, the firms denied collusion^ and
the exchange of any information other than of proposed price changes" (paras
8-8-8-17, 8-56-8-74, MMC (1986)). They made the point that in a competitive
market prices would be identical and would move closely together. They also
argued that it is not enough to consider only list prices, since there is
widespread discounting to buyers and so actual prices paid could well have
moved differently. To test this latter point the MMC examined the discount
structure of each seller. Until 1980 the rebate scales of the firms had been
identical. Furthermore, for the majority of buyers discounts have been
insignificant, amounting to less than i % of the list price. For a few very large
buyers, BS's discount structure after 1980 implied a price per tonne of roughly
0-25% below that of WP. Moreover, the MMC sampled a group of buyers to
identify the values of differences in prices they had been quoted by the two
sellers. These differences average about 0-5 % of the price, with the highest at
' Prior to the Restrictive Practices Act, 1956, a formal agreement to set common ex works and delivered
prices for producers and common resale prices for merchants had been in force for more than twenty years.
There was also an aggregated rebate scheme under which buyers received a discount based on aggregate
purchases from all sellers. The Act required such agreements to be registered with the Registrar of Restrictive
Practices, following which they could be challenged in the Restrictive Practices Court. The salt agreement
was discontinued and not registered.
' The firms explained that this was done because each bought salt from the other and it was usual to notify
buyers in advance of price increases.
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Table 2
Capacity Utilisation, Market Share, Prices and Profits
I.
II
III.
IV.
Capacity utilisation (%)
BS
WP (U.K. output/capacity)
WP (total output/capacity)
Shares of U.K. market (%)
BS
WP
ROC (%)
BS
WP
Rate of Price Increase (%)
Firm initiating
1980
85
54
75
54
46
46
33
19-4
BS
Souree: MMC
1981
71
47
60
53
47
45
32
7-5
WP
(1986).
Year
1982
79
43
65
58
42
53
30
14
WP
1983
69
40
59
57
43
52
24
8
WP
1984
67
41
64
55
45
53
24
5
WP
2-2% and the modal value close to zero (Table 5-14, MMC (1986)). The
proposition that buyers perceived price uniformity is supported by the fact that
around 78 % of buyers had not changed their sources of supply over the five
years previous to the enquiry (para 5-13, MMC (1986)).
Profits. The accounting rates of return on capital employed (ROC), net of
depreciation, and at historic cost, are shown for the two firms in Table 2, which
also gives some other important market information. Over the same period, the
comparable rate of return for all large quoted companies varied between 9 %
and 13%, and of companies in the chemicals and man-made fibres industries
between 7% and 16%. However, in the remainder ofthis paper we consider
only profits defined as revenues less variable and fixed production and
distribution costs. The reason is of course that the capital costs were essentially
sunk and did not vary either with the level of output or the shutdown decision.
Profits are the short run quasi-rents which the firms are assumed to maximise.
III. COMPETITION, PRICE LEADERSHIP, COLLUSION AND JOINT
PROFIT MAXIMISATION
The data on costs, capacities and prices given by the report we take to be ' hard
data'. Though they are subject to interpretation, the numbers themselves are
those the firms themselves would have had to work with. We can give
reasonably firm answers, on the basis only of these data and, in some cases,
general assumptions on demand, to the three questions with which we are
concerned. Did the firms behave non-cooperatively as in the Edgeworth-
Levitan-Shubik (ELS) or Deneckere-Kovenock models? If not, does an Abreu-
Lambsori type of explanation of collusion hold? Did they maximise joint
profits? We consider these in turn.
From the results summarised in Section I, we know that the one-shot non-
© Royal Economic Society 1993
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cooperative equilibrium involves firms operating at below capacity and
choosing mixed strategies in prices.^" Clearly, both firms were producing at less
than capacity. If they had been choosing prices according to mixed strategies,
then the probability that every time they chose prices those prices would be
identical, is zero. Yet on each of the 17 times prices were set in the period
1974-84 prices were in fact identical. Thus we could reject the ELS model, even
if we had no knowledge of the extent to which the firms actually exchanged
information on proposed price changes, and thus could be said to be correlating
strategies.
A somewhat stronger case could be made for the Deneckere-Kovenock
theory of price leadership. The theory predicts that the larger firm would be the
price leader. This was true in each year 1981-4. In the seven years previous to
that, leadership varied between the two firms, but we have cost data only for
1980-4. In the Deneckere-Kovenock model, the smaller firm could be price
leader if its marginal cost is sufficiently higher than that of the larger firm, and
only in 1980 can we certainly say that this was not true, so that BS's price
leadership in that year contradicts the theory. The theory also predicts that the
follower will price 'just below' the leader, and, though this is not consistent
with the data on list prices, the evidence on discounts given by the MMC could
perhaps be interpreted as just consistent with this. However, the crucial
mismatch is in respect of capacity utilisation. In the Deneckere-Kovenock
price leadership equilibrium, the follower sells at full capacity. This was clearly
not the case in the white salt market.
Thus, in this market at least, the predictions of the ELS and Deneckere-
Kovenock theories are not confirmed. The main reason, we would claim, is
that they are derived from one-shot non-cooperative equilibria.
In its evidence to the MMC, BS stated that 'if it raised prices by a lesser
amount than [WP], and [WP] failed to lower its own price to the same level,
there would be an immediate transfer of business to itself... This would lead to
a long-term retaliation by [WP] who would seek to take customers from British
Salt'. (MMC (1986), para 28-11). This statement shows that the firms clearly
share the intuition underlying the idea of collusive equilibrium supported by
the threat of retaliation, which is hardly surprising, simple as it is.
We now have to see if the outcome in this market is consistent with the more
formal theory. We assume that the actual prices and profits in each of the years
1980-4 correspond to collusive allocations, and we wish to test whether these
can be sustained by credible threats. Following Lambson (1987), we have the
criteria for:
(i) Sustainabiiity: Let nf denote the one-period profit firm i= 1,2 earns
under the agreement, nf the maximum profit it can earn by reneging on this
agreement, T^ a punishment path of prices that will be imposed in the period
°^ In fact there are two other equilibrium possibilities, each of which can be ruled out in the salt market.
Where firms' capacities are sufficiently large, we would have the Bertrand equilibrium with price equal to
marginal cost. This was clearly not the case here. Alternatively, if each firm's capacity is less than or equal
to its Cournot output in this market each would produce at capacity and price would clear the market. Since
both firms produced below capacity we can also rule out this as a possible equilibrium.
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follovi^ ing a violation ofthe agreement by firrn i, P^(TJ the present value at the
date punishmeht begins of profits to firm i along this path, r > o the per-period
interest rate and ^ = (i +r)"^ the discount factor. Then the agreed allocation
is sustainable if at each time t
nf-nf ^ nf/r-Smr,) i=i,2. (i)
This says that the one-period gain from deviating at time t is less than the
present value at t of the future loss of profit from having the punishment path
inflicted next period rather than enjoying the collusive profit forever. Provided
the punishment path is credible, satisfaction of (i) ensures that the threat of
future punishment will deter a one-shot violation of the agreement."
(ii) Credibility: Let nf denote the profit in some given period t that firm i will
make on a prescribed punishment path^^ nf^ the maximum profit it could
make at t if it reneged on the punishment path in that period, and Vf the present
value at t+i of profit the firm would earn from adhering to that prescribed
punishment path from t+ i onward. Then that punishment path is credible if
The right-hand side of (2) gives the present value at t ofthe difference in profits
between continuing along the prescribed punishment path from t+ i on, and
having a punishment path for a deviation imposed a.tt+i from its beginning.
The left-hand side gives the one-shot gain from deviating from the prescribed
punishment path. If this inequality is satisfied, it does not pay firm i to deviate
from the prescribed punishment path and so the threat of imposing that path
is credible.^*
To test whether these conditions can be satisfied in the market under study
we first need to specify a time period and associated interest rate. We take 3
months and 10% respectively as reasonable assumptions.^* Next we need to
specify the exact nature of the punishment price paths. In general, a path
which can satisfy (i) and (2) for some set of interest rates is not unique, but the
following specification has some intuitive appeal:
If either firm deviates, in the following three periods both firms set price at
aac2 and then they revert to the initial allocation.
Since on this (symmetric) punishment path price falls to WP's actual aac, it
makes no profit in the punishment phase, while BS makes a small profit because
its aac is somewhat lower. The punishment strategy corresponds to a 'price
" Abreu (1988) shows that if deviation is unprofitable for one period it will never be profitable.
Strictly we should write TT^^ , ( = i,... J = 1,2 since profits may well vary along a punishment path, and
the path may depend on which firm deviated, but no confusion should result from keeping the notation
uncluttered here.
" Simply rearranging the condition as Trf + SV^ir,) ^ 7rf + SV^ shows that we could equivalently
interpret the condition as saying it is better to continue along the given punishment path than to deviate this
period and have punishment begin anew next period.
The longer the time period, the more profitable does reneging become, since the longer the period for
which additional profit is earned and the further into the future retaliation takes place. Assuming a period
of one year does not change the conclusion that for reasonable interest rates the cooperative allocations in
this market were sustainable by credible threats, though to assume that one firm would take an entire year
to react to open price-cutting by the other is extreme. A quarterly interest rate of 10% is equivalent to an
annual rate of 46%, which again seems to be a reasonable upper bound.
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war' in which prices are slashed to the break-even level (at actual output) for
the higher cost firm.
To quantify the effects of punishment on the firms' profits as well as the gains
from one-shot deviations from the punishment path we require some
assumption about market demand. As a first approximation, we assume zero
elasticity of demand at any prices below the agreed price. Since, if this were
true at prices above the agreed price, the latter could not be profit maximising,
we are implicitly assuming a kink in demand at the actual price, possibly due
to the threat of imports.
Finally, we need to assume how total market demand will be shared between
the firms along a punishment path. Since they set the same prices, it seems
reasonable to assume that their market shares are as in the actual allocation.
Thus, effectively we assume that along a punishment path the firms would
produce the same outputs as those they actually produced, but at much lower
prices and profits. For each of the years 1980-4, we then calculate the values
ofthe quantities entering into conditions (i) and (2), given the punishment
strategies just described. The results^* are given in Table 3, and show that the
specified punishment path was credible in each year, and could sustain the
actual allocation.
Table 3
Gains and Losses from Deviation and Punishment
1980
I98I
1982
1983
1984
BS
367
964
800
1.377
1.631
WP
2,015
2,901
3.340
3.397
3.633
BS
3.347
4.172
5.143
5.041
6.035
WP
3.759
4,148
4,006
3.621
3.645
BS
256
376
276
494
468
(£000)
' - <
WP
1,068
636
735
948
819
BS
1,012
1,260
1.554
1.524
1,824
WP
1,136
1.254
1,211
1,094
1,101
(17%)
(•'6%)
(80%)
(26%)
(49%)
Thus for example if in the first quarter of 1984 BS (WP) had undercut the
agreed price slightly," it would have gained just over j ^ r6 m. {£^•6'^ m.) in
additional profit in that quarter, but would have lost just over £6 m.
(^3-65 m.) in present value of profit from the ensuing three quarter long price
war, relative to the agreed allocation.^' On the credibility of the punishment
path, if BS reneged on the first quarter's punishment, by setting price sHghtly
below the agreed level of WP's aac and producing to capacity, then it would
have made a net gain of close to £l m., but would have lost over ;^r8 m. in
present value of profit from postponing the time of reversion to the agreed
^^  Space limitations preclude presentation ofthe detailed calculations here. An appendix presenting these
was supplied to the referees and is available from the author upon request.
'* The numerical calculations assume a price cut resulting in a i % fall in 'net sales value', i.e. revenue
minus distribution cost per unit.
" In fact a punishment phase lasting only one quarter would have been sufficient to deter BS from
reneging on the agreed allocation. However this would not have been sufficient to deter BS from reneging
on the first period of a punishment path following a deviation by WP.
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allocation by one period. In WP's case, in 1980 and 1982 it was more profitable
to renege on the punishment path by setting price at the actual level and
allowing itself to be undercut by BS. Market demand in those years was
sufficiently high that its residual output was large enough to give it more profit
than if it undercut the punishment price slightly and produced at capacity. In
the other years market demand was so low that the latter was the better means
of reneging. In no year however did it pay WP to renege on punishment. The
figures in brackets are the quarterly interest rates at which condition (2) for WP
is just satisfied as an equality. Condition (2) for BS, (as well as condition (i)),
could be satisfied at far higher interest rates even than these. Thus we conclude
that on our assumptions conditions (i) and (2) were satisfied and cooperation
in this market was consistent with the Abreu-Lambson theory.
This then raises the question of how to explain the collusive allocation. The
solution most usually considered in the literature is that of joint profit
maximisation. On the face of it, this would immediately be rejected as an
explanation of the actual equilibrium in this market, since we would expect it
to imply that the firm with the lower marginal cost, in this case BS, would
produce to capacity, leaving the higher marginal cost firm to meet residual
demand. The fact that both firms produced well below capacity is then not
consistent with this. However, some care must be taken in drawing this
conclusion in the present instance, because two important non-convexities in
the cost functions complicate the analysis. First, as Fig i showed, at low levels
of output WP has to switch to 4-effect operation, resulting in a significant
increase in unit production cost (MMC(i986) para. 4-37). It may actually
minimise total production costs to keep WP's output high enough for it to
maintain 5-effect working, therefore. Secondly, for each firm there is a large
fixed production cost which is avoidable if the plant shuts down. In order to
identify the output allocation which minimises total avoidable costs, therefore,
we consider four sets of costs:
A. the variable and fixed production costs actually incurred in producing total
market output;
B. the cost resulting when BS produces to capacity in each year, with WP
meeting residual demand, on the assumption that 5-effect working could be
maintained and WP operates at the corresponding (actual) marginal cost;
C. the costs resulting when BS produces to capacity and WP meets residual
demand with 4-effect working;
D. the costs resulting when WP produces to capacity and BS meets residual
demand^* at its actual marginal cost.
Table 4 gives the results. The figures in brackets show the percentage
deviation of the given cost figure from the actual cost figure for that year.
Thus we see that total costs could have been around 2 % to 5 % lower if BS
had always produced to capacity, but only if WP would have been able to
18 Only in 1980 was total market output significantly greater than WP's capacity of 1095 kte pa. In 1983
and 1984 total output was less than this, and in 1981 and 1982 was greater by 4 kte and 30 kte respectively.
In neither of these two latter cases would it have been worth incurring the fixed production cost to open up
the BS plant.
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Table 4
Total Cost Comparisons
1980
I98I
1982
1983
1984
Output
(kte)
1.294
1.099
1.125
1,007
1,003
A
19.455
19,479
20,074
21,352
21,031
B
19,095 (-1-9)
18,399 (-5-5)
19,598 (-2-4)
20,567 (-37)
20,281 ( —3'6)
(£000)
C
19,884 ( + 2-2)
19,546 ( + 0-3)
20,393 (+""6)
21,117 (—ri)
20,852 ( — 0-8)
D
20,103 ( + 3"3)
17,170 (-ii-8)t
17,827 (-ir2)t
18,730 (-12-3)
18,054 (-14-2)
I The market would have been undersupplied by 4 kte.
X The market would have been undersupplied by 30 kte.
Figures in parentheses are % deviation of cost of B, C and D from A. A, B, C and D are defined above
in the text.
maintain 5-efFect working. If this had not been the case then overall there
would have been no cost advantage in doing this. The interesting result
however is that in every year except 1980, because market output was close to
or below WP's capacity, the cost-minimising policy was clearly to close BS's
plant and meet market demand only from WP. Although, even at full capacity
(6-effect) working WP's marginal cost was above that of BS, the latter's
capacity was too small to meet market demand, and the saving in fixed
production costs from shutting down BS more than offsets the higher variable
production costs from switching production to WP. Thus we can conclude that
the actual production allocation between BS and WP did not minimise total
costs, and therefore did not maximise joint profit. An explanation for the non-
maximisation of joint profit is of course that side-payments would have been
required, and these would have been clear evidence of collusion.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The first conclusion ofthis paper is that the type of market behaviour predicted
by the non-cooperative one-shot game models of Edgeworth, Levitan and
Shubik, and Deneckere and Kovenock was not observed in the white salt
market. The predictions of these models call into question the standard defence
of oligopolists (also used by the salt producers) that identical prices which
change (virtually) simultaneously by identical amounts is evidence of
' competitive' behaviour. Of course we cannot expect ' perfectly competitive'
outcomes in these markets, and the only feasible requirement for ' competitive'
behaviour is that it be non-cooperative. But in a market for which these models
are appropriate, namely a homogeneous, price-setting duopoly with ex-
ogenous capacity constraints, non-cooperative behaviour does not result in
identical prices.^* For this reason, we would support the MMC's conclusion
that the salt duopolists 'acted to restrain competition'.
°^ This is not to say that there are no non-cooperative duopoly models which predict identical prices —
homogeneous quantity-setting duopoly is obviously one. The point is rather that non-cooperative behaviour
may well not result in identical prices.
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The second conclusion is that the intuitive idea, apparently shared by the
firms, that deviation from the (possibly tacitly) agreed prices could not pay, is
fully borne out by application of the more formal analysis of Abreu and
Lambson. Taking a time period and interest rate which err on the side of
favouring deviation, we show that the gains from deviating from the actual
prices were easily outweighed by the losses from credible, relatively short-lived
punishments. Because of its lower degree of capacity utilisation, the higher cost
firm WP had the greater incentive to deviate, but a short price war in which
price was cut to its average avoidable cost was a credible deterrent to this
deviation. On the one hand this tells us that it is not difficult to explain
collusion in this market, and on the other that behaviour in the market was
consistent with the theory of Abreu and its extension by Lambson.
Finally, we conclude that the actual allocation did not correspond to joint
profit maximisation, because the output allocation did not minimise the
(avoidable) production costs of total output. The apparent cost minimising
allocation would have BS, the firm with lower marginal cost, producing to
capacity. However, given the fairly small residual output, this may well have
caused a jump in WP's marginal production cost and, our calculations show,
total cost may not have been lower as a result. In fact, given that aggregate
output was about or below WP's capacity, the cost minimising allocation
would involve shutting down BS, thus saving its fixed production costs, and
meeting total output requirements from WP. The general point is that the non-
convexities in the cost structures of the two firms make marginal cost-based
comparisons potentially misleading.
If side-payments between the firms are ruled out then there is no compelling
reason to expect the agreed allocation to be joint profit maximising. This is
reinforced in the present case by the extreme nature of the joint profit
maximising solution. This still leaves open the question of how to explain the
observed prices and outputs in this market. That appears to be a fruitful subject
for further study.
University ofGuelph
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